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NATIONAL SECURITY ExEMPTIONS IN FEDERAL POLLUTION
LAWS
AMY SHERIDAN'
I. INTRODUCTION
National security has been a principle highly regarded by lawmakers and
judges. When Congress toughens pollution laws, it almost invariably creates an
escape hatch for certain federal facilities and activities which is triggered in the
event that national security or the paramount interests of the United States are
threatened. This article addresses the national security exemptions in federal
pollution laws. Part II discusses sovereign immunity and the trend toward
waiving sovereign immunity for many federal facilities. Part III addresses
exemptions in seven federal pollution statutes. Part IV analyzes the only
application of an exemption clause, which was for a Haitian and Cuban refugee
center at a Puerto Rican Army base. Part V explores several cases where the
government claimed it was entitled to a national security defense even where it
had not requested an exemption. Finally, Part VI concludes by examining recent
trends in national security exemptions and the possibility of future exemptions.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
For years the federal government was allowed to pollute its own facilities
without any danger of being sued. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a
durable shield against liability for environmental law violations. As set forth in
Block v. North Dakota,' the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the United
States from being sued without the consent of Congress.2 The longstanding
policy supporting the doctrine is that the government should be free to operate
without interference?
To sue the government for violating an environmental statute, a plaintiff
must show that the government has waived sovereign immunity. Only Congress
* Ms. Sheridan is an attorney with the Virginia State Corporation Commission. She received her
B.A. from the University of Oklahoma in 1989, and her J.D. in 1993 and LL.M. in 1994 from
Tulane Law School.
1. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
2. Id at 287.
3. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
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has this authority.4 The waiver must be clear and unambiguous because courts
strictly construe waivers in the government's favor.'
All major federal environmental statutes now waive sovereign immunity,
at least to some degree. For example, some statutes require federal departments
and agencies to comply with federal, state, local and interstate regulatory
requirements."
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") provides that federal departments and agencies shall
be liable to the same degree as nongovernmental entities.7 CERCLA also requires
compliance with state laws concerning removal and remedial action when the
federal facility is not included on the National Priorities List.' These provisions
ensure equal liability for both governmental and nongovernmental entities.
Accordingly, states must apply their laws evenly and cannot place more stringent
standards on federal facilities than on nonfederal sites.
Court decisions have clarified the scope of CERCLA's waiver. In Maine
v. Navy, the court held that CERCLA's waiver of immunity as to state laws does
not waive immunity from civil punitive penalties.9 In Rospatch Jessco Corp. v.
Chrysler Corp., the court held that CERCLA's waiver applies only to facilities
currently owned or operated by the United States.1" Thus, the government was
immune from state liability for the Air Force's past ownership of a polluting
facility when it no longer owned the facility.1 In Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., the court held that
CERCLA clearly waived sovereign immunity from the imposition of attorney's
fees and costs. 2
In addition to the statutorily enacted waivers in CERCLA, both the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") and the Clean Air Act ("CAA") require federal
agencies to comply with all substantive and procedural federal, state and local
requirements, including any processes and/or sanctions.'" Although these
generally worded waivers appear extremely broad, their extent is questionable.
4. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
5. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Mitzelfelt v. Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293
(10th Cir. 1990).
6. See e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); Clean Water Act §
313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988).
7. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
8. Id. § 9620(a)(4).
9. 973 F.2d 1007, 1010 (1st Cir. 1992).
10. 829 F. Supp. 224, 227-28 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
11. Id.
12. 826 F. Supp. 961, 965 (E.D. Va. 1993).
13. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 300(j)(6)(b) (1988)); Clean Air Act § 118(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1988).
288 [Vol. 19:287
NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS
Whether they include waivers from civil penalties is not clear from the face of the
statutes. Furthermore, a federal facility's obligation to pay air pollution
regulatory fees pursuant to a local air pollution district's rules is not waived.' 4
Regulatory fees are different in nature from civil penalties, and it remains to be
seen whether a court will interpret "sanction" to include penalties.
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the United States is expressly
liable for civil penalties, but only for those "arising under Federal law or imposed
by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court."' 5
Thus, the federal government is not liable for civil penalties arising under
municipal water pollution law. 6 However, federal agencies are liable for
violations of federally sanctioned state water pollution laws. 7
The sovereign immunity provision in the Noise Control Act ("NCA") is
generous to the government. It directs federal agencies to carry out the programs
within their control in such a manner as to further the policy of the NCA, but
only "to the fullest extent consistent with their authority under Federal laws."'"
The waiver provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") states that the government has no immunity for "substantive and
procedural" requirements." Prior to the 1992 amendments to RCRA, then
entitled the "Federal Facilities Compliance Act", the term "requirements" did not
include civil penalties.20 In 1992, however, Congress made it clear that federal
agencies are subject to penalties and fines under RCRA. The 1992 amendments
defined "substantive and procedural requirements" to include "all administrative
orders and all civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for
isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations." 2'
III. EXEMPTIONS FOR FEDERAL FACILITIES
Despite waivers of sovereign immunity in the federal pollution statutes,
federal facilities can be exempted from compliance with such laws. Each statute
contains a provision whereby the President can sign an executive order declaring
a facility exempt if he finds the exemption to be of paramount interest to the
14. United States v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal.
1990).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
16. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
17. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. United States Postal Serv., 810 F. Supp. 605 (M.D.
Pa. 1992).
18. NCA § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4903(a) (1988).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (amended 1992).
20. See Ohio v. Department of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1990).
21. Pub. L. No. 102-386 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6961 et seq. (Supp. IV 1992)).
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United States or in the interests of national security. The language and scope of
the exemptions vary.
A. CERCLA
CERCLA allows for an exemption regarding a response action at a
specified facility of the Department of Energy ("DOE") or the Department of
Defense ("DOD") when the exemption is necessary to protect the national security
interests of the United States.22 When an exemption is granted, the response
action can proceed, but certain statutory requirements are lifted.2' An exemption
must be for a specified period not to exceed one year.2' An additional exemption
can be granted if the President issues a new order, again with a duration limit of
one year. The statute does not prohibit granting perpetual extensions, provided
the President issues a new order when each old order expires.26
CERCLA does not spell out any criteria of "national security" which the
President must consider before granting an exemption. The President'has broad
discretion to determine what actions are in the interest of national security.
Congress provided a check on the President's exemption authority, however, by
requiring the President to notify Congress within thirty days of the issuance of an
exemption order.27 The notification must contain a statement of the reasons for
granting the exemption." There is no provision, though, for a Congressional
override of the President's exemption authority. By requiring the disclosure of
all exemptions, Congress apparently believed the President would wield his
authority carefully.
When an exemption from certain CERCLA requirements is issued, the
response action must proceed "as expeditiously as practicable." '29 This wording
allows for significant delay tactics. For example, the manager of the facility can
stall the response action by telling the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
that the action is not "practicable." Although the statute has no mechanism to
speed up an exempted response action, there is one check. Congress must be
notified periodically of the progress of any response action subject to a national
security exemption. 0 In addition, the President cannot grant a CERCLA
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9620G)(1).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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exemption due to lack of appropriation unless he specifically requested such
appropriation as a part of the budgetary process and Congress failed to grant it.3'
CERCLA as enacted in 1980 did not contain any reference to federal
facility compliance.32 The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 ("SARA") added section 120 requiring federal facility compliance.33 The
change was motivated by a 1984 General Accounting Office report which
identified approximately 340 potential federal civilian hazardous waste sites and
473 DOD bases with potential hazardous waste sites.34 Congress required federal
facilities to comply with CERCLA to the same extent as nongovernmental
entities, and it recognized the need for case-by-case exemptions.3 The legislative
history is silent on the reasons for the precise wording of this exemption.
B. RCRA
The exemption provision in RCRA is considerably broader than that in
CERCLA. The President may exempt any solid waste management facility of
any department, agency or instrumentality in the executive branch from a RCRA
requirement if he determiies the exemption to be in the paramount interest of the
United States. 6 "Paramount" interest is certainly broader than "national security"
interest. The President is given the discretion to determine what is in the
paramount interest of the United States.37 This discretion is dangerously broad.
Arguably, the President could determine that reducing federal spending is of
paramount interest and exempt all solid waste management facilities at all federal
facilities. Of course, this decision would be politically unpopular, but no
statutory mechanism bars the irresponsible granting of exemptions.
The procedures for granting and renewing a RCRA exemption are similar
to those in CERCLA. The duration limit is one year, and additional exemptions
can be granted for up to one year each. 8 Each January the President is required
to report to Congress on all RCRA exemptions granted during the preceding year,
along with the reasons for granting each exemption.39 No exemption can be
granted on the basis of lack of appropriation unless the President requested
appropriation and Congress refused it.4"
31. Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988)).
33. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 120, 100 Stat. 1613, 1666 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1988)).
34. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2840.
35. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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When RCRA was enacted in 1976, Congress looked to the federal
facilities provisions of the CAA and the CWA in formulating its opinion of how
RCRA should treat such facilities.4 The resulting scheme was set forth in section
6001.42 The EPA Administrator was required to promulgate regulations applying
to federal facilities that mandated compliance with certain guidelines.43 The
regulations would preempt state and local law. The statute gave the President,
or his designee, the authority to grant an exemption to any facility or activity of
the federal government if he determined that national security interests required
such."
The 1992 Federal Facilities Compliance Act changed the scheme of the
1976 Act by eliminating the special regulations and requiring federal facilities to
follow federal, state, and local law.4 ' An exemption provision for paramount
interests was implemented replacing the 1976 national security exemption. 46 The
legislative history provides no rationale for the change in terms.
47
C. CAA
The exemption provision in the CAA is also broad in scope. The
President can exempt "any emission source of any department, agency, or
instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance" with CAA requirements
if he determines it to be of paramount interest to the United States.4' Despite this
broad language, Congress has placed a restriction on the President's exemption
power for two provisions of the CAA. First, no exemption can be granted from
section I 11, which sets forth new stationary source performance standards.49
Second, exemptions from section 112 standards for hazardous air pollutants can
only be granted in accordance with section 112(i)(4)." An exemption from
section 112 can be for up to two years, subject to unlimited extensions of up to
two years each.5 Exemptions from all other provisions are limited to one year,
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6238, 6283-84.
42. RCRA, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 6001, 90 Stat. 2795, 2821 (1976) (codified and amended as 42
U.S.C. § 6961 (1992)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6961 et seq.; see also supra note 22.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).
47. See H.R. REP. NO. 111, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287.
48. CAA § 118(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (1988).
49. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)-(j).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b). Section 7412(i)(4) states that an exemption for a stationary source can
be granted if the President determines that the necessary technology is unavailable and that it is in
the national security interest of the United States to do so.
51. Id.
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with extensions of up to one year. 2 Each January, the President must report all
exemptions, along with the reasons for granting them, to Congress. 3
Under the CAA, the President has the unusual authority to issue
regulations exempting "any weaponry, equipment, aircraft, vehicles, or other
classes or categories of property" owned or operated by the Armed Forces or by
the National Guard of any state if the property is uniquely military in nature.5
Again, to issue these regulations, the President must determine that doing so is
of paramount interest to the United States.5 Every three years, the President
must reconsider the need for such regulations. 6 To date, no regulations have
been issued. The authority to issue regulations is a tremendous power, but the
CAA does not spell out the issuing procedures. At a minimum, the President is
constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act57 ("APA") and thus cannot act
arbitrarily.
The first CAA provision for federal facility compliance appeared in the
1963 Clean Air Act.5 Federal facilities were ordered to cooperate with the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") in preventing and
controlling air pollution, to the extent practicable and consistent with the interests
of the United States and within any available appropriation.59 The Act created a
federal air permit system whereby the Secretary of HEW could establish classes
of potential pollution sources for federal facilities and require facilities to get a
permit.6" The Secretary could revoke the permits if he found pollution was
endangering the health and welfare of any person." The loose language of the
federal facilities compliance provision and the Secretary's discretion in
establishing classes of sources were large loopholes. The President could
unofficially exempt a facility by finding compliance inconsistent with national
interests or by appointing an obedient HEW Secretary.
Section 118 of the 1970 CAA amendments created the first explicit
exemption provision.62 The language has not been changed. Unfortunately, the
legislative history gives no guidance on the reasons for the language. 3 Shortly
before the 1990 CAA amendments were enacted, the Pentagon sought a broad
executive order that would exempt the military from the pending clean air bill as
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
58. Pub. L.No. 88-206, § 7(a), 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1857(g) (1988)).
59. Id.
60. Id § 7(b).
61. Id.
62. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (1988)).
63. See 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356.
1995]
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
well as state and local regulations.64 DOD General Counsel Terance O'Donnell
asked President Bush to sign an order "to exempt all aircraft, spacecraft, wheeled
and tracked vehicles, vessels, and weapons as well as the burning or detonating
of munitions and emissions from paints or other chemicals used to repair or
refurbish military vehicles, planes, ships, or equipment."65 Under the Pentagon's
proposal, the EPA would establish standards for the DOD and oversee the
military exemption.
The DOD was worried about how the cost of compliance with standards
under the proposed CAA amendments would impact national security.66 The
military wanted to ensure a single national standard for all military items.67
Senator Timothy Wirth (D-Colo.) was "deeply suspicious" of the Pentagon's
request.68 Wirth argued that the Pentagon's concerns about state standards were
unfounded and that there would be no conflict between various state and federal
standards.69 Bush did not sign the proposed executive order, but Congress
included a provision in the amended CAA authorizing the President to issue
regulations exempting military property.
D. CWA
The exemption provision in the CWA is nearly identical to that in the
CAA. The President may exempt any effluent source of any department, agency
or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with the CWA if he
determines such exemption to be of paramount interest to the United States.
70
Exemptions from the requirements of section 306 (national standards of
performance) and of section 307 (toxic and pretreatment effluent standards)
cannot be granted. Exemptions are granted for one year, with extensions of no
more than one year each.7' In January, the President must report exemptions and
the reasons to Congress.72 Lack of appropriation is not a valid reason for an
exemption unless the President requested an appropriation and Congress refused
it.,
Similar to the provision in the CAA, the President has the authority under
the CWA to issue regulations exempting classes of military equipment if he
64. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1932 (Apr. 6, 1990).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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determines that the regulations are of paramount interest to the United States74---a
broader standard than national security interest.75 Because military matters
necessarily relate to national security, the low threshold of paramount interest is
too easy to satisfy. Congress should have used national security as the
prerequisite for issuing regulations. To date, however, no regulations have been
issued under the military equipment provision.
The CWA was enacted in 1948 as the Water Pollution Control Act
("WPCA").76 Originally, the statute did not address federal facilities. An implied
national security exemption was included in the 1956 amendments by way of
section 9 entitled, "Cooperation to control pollution from federal installations."'77
Federal facilities were required to comply with the WPCA "insofar as practicable
and consistent with the interests of the United States and within any available
appropriations." '78 The loose wording would allow nearly any federal facility to
evade the law under the auspices of practicality.
In 1972, amendments to the CWA created an explicit limited exemption.79
Congress wanted each federal agency to provide national leadership in the control
of water pollution.8" As a result, federal facilities must now meet all pollution
control requirements as if they were private citizens.8 Congress recognized,
however, that case-by-case exemptions may be necessary, such as when it is in
the paramount interest of the United States that a plant or facility not achieve full
water pollution control within the time required.82 Like the legislative history of
nearly all pollution control statutes, the history of the CWA is silent on which
criteria the President should apply to define the nation's paramount interest.
E. NCA
The exemption provision in the NCA is similar to those in the CAA and
the CWA. The President can exempt any single activity or facility, including
noise emission sources or classes thereof, of any department, agency, or
instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with any NCA
requirement.8 3 The President must determine that the exemption is of paramount
74. Id (allowing exemptions for "weaponry, equipment aircraft, vessels, vehicles or other
classes").
75. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
76. Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, reprinted in 1945 U.S.C.S.S. 843-49.
77. Pub. L. No. 84-660, § 9, ch. 518 (1956) (codified and amended as 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)
(1988)).
78. Id.
79. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668.
80. Id at 3733-34 (discussing § 313 of the 1972 CWA).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 4903(b).
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interest to the United States. 4 No exemption, other than for products referred to
in section 4902(3)(B) of the NCA, may be granted from the requirements of
sections 4905, 4916, and 4917.85 The NCA exemption has the standard one year
time limit as well as the requirement to report exemptions and reasons to
Congress.8 6 Lack of appropriation is not a basis for an exemption.1
7
The legislative history of the NCA provides little insight into the reasons
for the specific provision.8 The original language of the statute contained no
exemption. Section 406 in the original act merely stated that federal facilities
must comply with the Act in a manner consistent with the standards and policies
of the Act. 9 Thus, federal agencies could have excused their noncompliance by
arguing that compliance was inconsistent with the policy of the Act due to
national security concerns.
F. SDWA
The SDWA, enacted in 1974, contains a national security provision that
differs from those previously discussed.9" Under the SDWA, the Secretary of
Defense must request an exemption, which is called a waiver in this statute.91
After the Secretary makes a request, the President must determine that the waiver
is necessary in the interest of national security.92 The Administrator of the EPA
then grants the waiver.93 The Administrator must keep a written record of the
basis upon which the waiver was granted and make the record available for in
camera examination in a judicial proceeding when relevant.94 Apparently,
Congress intended this exemption to be reviewable, unlike exemptions committed
solely to the discretion of the President. When the waiver is issued, the
84. Id.
85. Id. The term "product" does not include:
(i) any military weapons or equipment which are designed for combat use; (ii)
any rockets or equipment which are designed for research, experimental or
developmental work to be performed by [NASA]; or (iii) to the extent provided
by regulations of the [EPA] Administrator, any other machinery or equipment
designed for use in experimental work done by or for the Federal Government.
Id. Section 4905 contains noise emission standards for products distributed in commerce. Section
4916 contains railroad noise emission standards. Section 4917 contains motor carier noise emission
standards.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See S. REP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655.
89. Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, §§ 1-19, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1431, 1431-51.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 3000)(6).
91. Id. § 300(j)(6)(b).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Administrator must publish a notice in the Federal Register.9' The Secretary of
Defense may ask the Administrator to refrain from publishing the notice if
publication itself would endanger national security interests.96  If the
Administrator withholds publication, notice must be given to the Armed Services
Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives.97 There is no
statutory time limit for exemptions from the SDWA, nor is there any procedure
for an extension. Clearly, this national security provision provides much more
public notice and a more balanced decisionmaking structure than similar
provisions in other statutes. Importantly, the SDWA does not vest unbridled
authority in the President.
The present language of the national security waiver is exactly the same
as that in the original 1974 Act, the only change being that the sections were
renumbered.98 In the 1974 Act, the exemption was listed in section 1447(b). In
the amended Act, it is found in section 300(j)(6)(b). Interestingly, the legislative
history of the 1974 Act indicates that there can be no waiver of compliance with
national primary drinking water regulations.99 The statute as enacted contained
no such language. The SDWA was last amended in 1977. '00 The legislative
history to the amendments reasserts Congress' intent that federal facilities comply
with the SDWA, but it is silent as to the national security exemption.10
G. NEPA
Unlike other federal pollution control statutes, the National Environmental
Protection Act '02 ("NEPA") does not expressly provide an exemption for purposes
of national security. A careful reading of section 102 of NEPA, however,
indicates that Congress intended to incorporate the national security exemption of
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").0 3 Section 102 requires that copies of
a prepared environmental impact statement ("EIS") be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") and the public as
provided by section 552 of FOIA.'0 4 Section 552 of FOIA exempts from public
disclosure any matter that is specifically authorized, under criteria established by
an executive order, to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat 1661 (1974).
99. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454.
100. See Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1393 (1977).
101. See supra note 99.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
103. 42 U.S.G. § 4332; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. 11V 1992).
104. Id. § 102(c).
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policy and that is in fact properly classified pursuant to an executive order. 105
Thus, NEPA provides an exemption from disclosing a prepared EIS on the
grounds of national defense. Importantly, NEPA does not exempt the preparation
of an EIS under any circumstances. Once a proposal is made for a major federal
action, an EIS must be prepared.
10 6
Soon after NEPA's enactment, the statute's application to military
exercises was questioned. In McQueary v. Laird, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
government's storage of chemical and biological warfare agents at Rocky Flats.
10 7
While the court did not directly address the issue of whether NEPA provided an
exemption on the grounds of national security, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit did state that the government had wide latitude to handle
military facilities and that courts should not interfere by forcing the military to
comply with NEPA.' 8 In Nielson v. Seaborg, residents of Utah sought to enjoin
the government from testing nuclear weapons because doing so was inconsistent
with NEPA.0 9 The plaintiffs alleged a violation of procedural requirements,
however they failed to support this allegation with specific facts."0 The court
held that the military had broad discretion in making its decisions and that the
substantive provisions of NEPA were not violated."' In Concerned about Trident
v. Rumsfeld, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck a
blow to the government by holding that NEPA did not contain a military or
national security exemption because there was no statutory or judicial foundation
for such."'
An important Supreme Court decision clarified the demands NEPA places
on the government. In Weinberger v. Catholic Action Hawaii/Peace Education
Project, the Court found that the Navy's top secret plan to construct a facility
capable of storing nuclear weapons was not a "proposal" and therefore no EIS
was needed." 3 Navy regulations forbid either admitting or denying that nuclear
weapons are actually stored at the facility." 4 An executive order specifically
classified all information relating to the storage of nuclear weapons." 5 Because
the project was merely contemplated and the Navy could not comment on it, the
plaintiffs could not prove that a "proposal" existed." 6
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976).
107. 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971).
108. Id. at 612.
109. 348 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Utah 1972).
110. Id. at 1373.
111. Id. at 1372.
112. 555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
113. 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981).
114. Id. at 141.
115. Id. at 144.
116. Id. at 146.
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NEPA provides that, "to the fullest extent possible," federal agencies
should comply with EIS preparation requirements." 7 The Court found that the
EIS decisionmaking requirements of NEPA were not the same as the NEPA
public disclosure provisions."1 8 An agency might have to include environmental
considerations in its decisionmaking process yet withhold public disclosure of any
NEPA documents based on a FOIA exemption." 9 The Court focused on the
language in NEPA regarding disclosure of information, holding that if the Navy
proposed to build a nuclear weapons storage facility, it must prepare NEPA
documents but need not disclose them if the matter falls within a FOIA
exemption. 120
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan,
wrote that the majority's emphasis on FOIA was misplaced.'' They stressed that
neither the language of NEPA nor the CEQ regulations provide an exemption for
classified or confidential proposals.' 2 In fact, NEPA and DOD regulations
required the drafting of an EIS regardless of whether some material would be
classified and thus exempt from disclosure under FOIA.'" Justice Blackmun
wrote that the need for an EIS was even greater when classified information was
involved because the public has no access to the military decisionmaking
process.'24
In Weinberger, the Supreme Court essentially created a NEPA national
security exemption. Federal facilities, especially military operations, can escape
EIS requirements by keeping projects top secret so they never become a
"proposal.""'2 If an EIS must be written, it can remain private if it falls within
a FOIA exemption. Therefore, major federal actions undertaken under the veil
of national security can remain safe from public scrutiny and judicial attack.
IV. EXEMPTION IN FORT ALLEN
To date, the exemptions in the federal pollution laws have been exercised
only once. On October 3, 1980, President Carter signed Executive Order 12,244
exempting Fort Allen in Puerto Rico from compliance with the CWA, CAA,
NCA and RCRA. 2 6 The exemption was for a one year period beginning October
2, 1980, and ending October 1, 1981.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
118. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 145-46.
119. Id. at 143.
120. Id. at 146.
121. Id. at 149.
122. Id. at 148.
123. Id. at 147-48.
124. Id. at 149.
125. Id. at 146.
126. Exec. Order No. 12,244, 45 Fed. Reg. 66, 443 (1980), cited in 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
1995] 299
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Fort Allen was a United States Naval Communications Center on its last
stages of dismantling before transfer to the Puerto Rican National Guard. It
became a relocation and temporary housing site for Haitian and Cuban refugees.
The President declared that granting the exemption was in the "paramount interest
of the United States."' 7 Each effluent source was exempt from compliance with
the CWA except for sections 306 and 307.' Each emission source was
exempted from compliance with the CAA except for sections 111 and 112. '29
Each activity or facility was exempted from compliance with the NCA except for
sections 6, 17 and 18, which the President had no authority to exempt. Finally,
each solid waste management facility was exempted from compliance with
RCRA.
On October 1, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,327
extending the Fort Allen exemption for one year.3 Reagan's Order preserved
the language and scope of Carter's previous order.
A. Political Climate
When President Carter signed Executive Order 12,244 on October 3,
1980, he was at a critical stage in his reelection campaign. The Executive Order
indicated that the President "determined it to be in the paramount interest of the
United States" to exempt Fort Allen from federal pollution laws.' Near the end
of September 1980, the White House held a closed meeting in which the
Administration decided to send Cuban and Haitian refugees to Puerto Rico.'12
Refugees were arriving by the boatload in Miami, and many were detained in
Florida. In the spring and summer of 1980, approximately 122,000 Cuban and
9,500 Haitian refugees entered the United States. 33 President Carter created a
Cuban-Haitian Task Force to oversee government efforts to resettle the
refugees. 34 One week after Carter signed Executive Order 12,244 (and while he
was on a campaign swing through Florida), Congress passed the Refugee
Education and Assistance Act of 1980 ("REAA"), 3' and Carter signed Executive
127. Id.
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1323. These sections deal with national standards of performance and toxic and
pretreatment effluent standards. The President is not authorized to grant an exemption from these
sections.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7418. The President is not authorized to grant an exemption from § 111
(standards of performance for new stationary sources), and an exemption from § 112 (hazardous air
pollutants) must be in accordance with § 112(i)(4) (allowing a two year exemption for technology
reasons so long as such exemption is in the national security interests of the United States).
130. Exec. Order No. 12,327, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,893 (1981).
131. See Exec. Order No. 12,244, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,443 (1980).
132. Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1042 (D.P.R. 1981).
133. Id. at 1041.
134. Colon v. Carter, 507 F. Supp. 1026 (D.P.R. 1980).
135. Refugee Education and Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 96-422, § 501(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1522(1982).
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Order 12,246 delegating his authority under the REAA to the Secretary of
State.' 3
6
Florida residents complained that refugees living in Florida were
overburdening the welfare capacities of the state. 37 The Task Force selected Fort
Allen in Puerto Rico, a military installation due for deactivation, as a refugee
facility. Critics accused Carter of attempting to pick up Florida votes by shipping
the refugees off to nonvoting Puerto Rico.138 Puerto Rico's Governor Carlos
Romero Barcelo, facing a tough reelection campaign, strongly opposed the plan
to send refugees to Puerto Rico. 39
Puerto Ricans were concerned that their serious unemployment problem
would worsen with the influx of refugees. 4 0 They worried that the United States
would send criminals or the mentally ill.14  They were anxious about the
environmental problems that would likely be created by the rapid construction of
holding facilities. 142 Puerto Rican officials feared that the transfers would force
construction that would burden sewage facilities, pollute rivers and create health
hazards. 43 In addition, immense heat and abundant malaria-bearing Anopheles
mosquitoes near Fort Allen would create public health problems.
4
B. Attacks on the President's Authority
Due to concerns regarding public health and the environment, the Puerto
Rican government and several private citizens filed suit to block the construction
of temporary housing at Fort Allen as well as the transfer of refugees from
Florida to Fort Allen.4 5 Three cases formed one rule of law. Following is a
brief outline of the procedural maelstrom caused by the case, in addition to an
examination of the case at each stage.
Plaintiffs sought and won a preliminary injunction to block the move of
refugees to Fort Allen.4 6 United States Judge Torruella worried that potential
health and environmental hazards might affect the refugees and the adjacent
communities. 1
41
136. Exec. Order No. 12,246, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,367 (1980).
137. U.S. To Appeal Ruling Blocking Refugee Move, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1980 [hereinafter
US. to Appeal].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Untitled, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1980.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Colon, 507 F. Supp. 1026.
146. Id. at 1032. See also US. To Appeal, supra note 138.
147. Colon, 507 F. Supp. at 1030.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction, giving the United States government permission to transfer
refugees.148 The court reasoned that Puerto Rico had not demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood of success on the issue of whether the President had legal
authority to transfer the refugees. 49 In response, the Puerto Rican government
submitted an emergency request to Supreme Court Justice Brennan. Brennan
temporarily blocked the transfer of refugees until the full Court could consider the
issue. 5 The Supreme Court lifted the blockade, and the case returned to the trial
court.'' The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico again
banned the use of Fort Allen for refugees and denied a request to stay the order
pending appeal.' 52 The United States government, citing a "crisis of grave
dimension," submitted a motion to the Court of Appeals requesting permission to
transfer refugees immediately.'53 The government argued that the effective
operation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service required immediate relief
from overcrowding in Florida. 5 4 The United States government sought to transfer
nearly 2,000 refugees to Fort Allen and promised not to send identified criminals
or mentally disabled people.'55 The court approved the move. Finally on August
8, 1991, Justice Brennan cleared the way for the transfer of approximately 800
Haitian refugees by turning down an emergency stay request from city officials
and residents of Juana Diaz, the Puerto Rican community in which Fort Allen is
located.' 56
In the first of the consolidated cases, plaintiffs alleged that the transfer of
refugees would violate the United States Constitution, NEPA, CWA, RCRA and
the Disaster Relief Act ("DRA").'57 In its defense, the government cited
executive order exemptions. The United States District Judge for the District of
Puerto Rico made the following findings of fact:
" President Carter declared an emergency pursuant to the DRA and
formed the Cuban-Haitian Task Force.'58
* In the summer of 1980, refugees coming into Florida were
temporarily housed at processing centers in Krome, Florida.'59
148. Colon v. Carter, 633 F.2d 964, 967 (1st Cir. 1980).
149. Id.
150. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. at 1040.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Quick Decision Urged on Facility for Refugees, BOSTON GLOBE, July 16, 1981.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Transfer of Refugees OK'd, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1981.
157. Colon, 507 F. Supp. at 1027.
158. Id. at 1028.
159. Id.
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" Improper sewage, overcrowding and the lack of soap and towels at
the temporary facilities caused serious health and sanitation
hazards.' 60
" The government looked for alternative facilities by making an
inventory of available DOD facilities. The inventory listed thirty-six
sites in the Continental United States and none in Puerto Rico. By
mid-September 1980, the search inexplicably focused on two sites in
Puerto Rico, Ramey Field and Fort Allen. Fort Allen was chosen on
September 23, 1980.61
" Fort Allen's population averaged 500 to 800 persons and never
exceeded 1,500.62
" The capacity of the camp under construction was 5,000. The
government submitted conflicting figures regarding the number of
refugees expected to transfer to Fort Allen. The refugees housed at
Krome facilities were sent to Fort Allen along with all new
entrants.1
63
" The anticipated construction consisted of twelve living tents, each
capable of holding thirty people, in each of the fourteen
compounds.'"
* The existing water treatment facility handled a maximum of 1,500
persons. Excess population created a danger to public health.'
61
The court made these conclusions of law:
" Plaintiffs had standing to sue the government. The citizens alleged
an actual or threatened injury to themselves. Puerto Rico alleged an
injury to its natural resources and can sue in its capacity as parens
patriae to its people's health and welfare.1 66
" The government's actions constituted a "major federal action" within
the meaning of NEPA. The failure to create an EIS was in violation
of NEPA.167
" Under the DRA, the President's declaration of emergency, while
entitled to some deference, is subject to review.' 68
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1028-29.
162. Id. at 1029.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1030.
167. Id. at 1030-31.
168. Id. at 1031.
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• An "emergency" under the DRA is exempt from NEPA' 69
• "Emergency" means only a natural disaster. The plain language of
the DRA indicates that "emergency" cannot apply to the refugee
situation. Because no emergency existed, the NEPA exemption did
not apply.
70
• The Executive Order granting exemptions from various pollution laws
was a valid exercise of Presidential authority. 7 '
The court found grounds for granting plaintiffs the preliminary injunction:
plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm, no adequate remedy existed at law, the
balance of equities did not favor defendants and finally plaintiffs would likely
succeed on the merits.17 The court enjoined the government from transferring
refugees to Fort Allen until it complied with NEPA.173 While ruling that the
Presidential exemption grant was a valid exercise of power, the court did not
address the validity of the language in the Executive Order, such as whether the
President exceeded the authority granted to him by the various pollution
statutes. 74
Shortly after the court granted the preliminary injunction, Congress passed
REAA creating a NEPA exemption to provide assistance to Cuban and Haitian
refugees. 75 The government quickly filed a motion for reconsideration of the
preliminary injunction. 76  Upon reconsideration, the court set aside the
preliminary injunction halting construction at Fort Allen. Furthermore, the court
preserved the injunction impeding the transfer of people, requiring the
government to prepare an EIS on the transfer issue.'77 The court also found that
an executive order delegating the President's authority under the REAA to the
Secretary of State was reviewable under the APA.'
78
Both parties appealed the partial grant of the preliminary injunction.'79
The Court of Appeals vacated the injunction against the transfer of people and
refused to reinstate the injunction against construction.' 0 The court conditioned
its ruling on the promise that the government would transfer no more than 2,000
169. Id. at 1031-32.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1032.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1032-33.
174. Id.
175. See Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799 (1980).
176. Colon, 507 F. Supp. at 1033.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see Exec. Order No. 12,246, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,367 (1980); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
179. Colon, 633 F.2d at 964.
180. Id. at 967.
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refugees and would provide adequate security to ensure the safety of nearby
residents.' 8 '
On appeal, the court found that the Executive Order regarding the REAA,
which designated Fort Allen a relocation site, was not subject to judicial review
under the APA.'82 The court presumed that the President was an agency within
the meaning of the APA.'83 It reasoned that the President's decision was
discretionary by law and therefore unreviewable. In deciding the issue of
reviewability, the court presumed that the decision was reviewable but allowed
the government to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence that
Congress intended to cut off review.'84 Where Congress has not made a clear
declaration of its intent, the court should consider three factors: (1) the
appropriateness of the issues raised for review, (2) the need for judicial
supervision to safeguard plaintiff's interests, and (3) the impact of review on the
effectiveness of the agency in carrying out its assigned role.'85
Here, the court found that the REAA expressly gave the President
discretion to determine the terms and conditions of refugee assistance.'86
Therefore, his decision was not reviewable even by the arbitrary and capricious
standard.'8 7 The court did not rule on the reviewability of the Executive Order
granting the pollution law exemptions. Considering that the pollution statutes
gave the President discretion to grant exemptions if he determined them to be of
paramount interest to the United States, however, the court would have most
likely concluded that the issue was unreviewable. Furthermore, the test for
reviewability gives the court great flexibility in finding an action unreviewable.
On October 24, 1980, Justice Brennan stayed the court's decision. 8 The full
Court vacated the stay on November 3, 1980.89
Next, the district court considered arguments for a permanent
injunction. 9 Finding that the government violated RCRA, NEPA and other
federal and state laws, the district court issued a permanent injunction against the
transfer of refugees.' The remaining issue was whether to allow construction.
In ordering the permanent injunction, the court heavily relied on the facts
of the situation. It described an array of horrible conditions wrought by the
influx of thousands of refugees. 92 The court did not want to allow the creation
181. Id.
182. Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,246, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,367 (1980); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
183. Colon, 633 F.2d at 966 n.5.
184. Id at 967 (citing Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970)).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. at 1040.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1039.
191. Id. at 1063.
192. Id. at 1043-44.
1995]
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
of a "Haitian ghetto" in Puerto Rico.1 93 The two largest concerns were the
generation of waste water and solid waste. 19 4 The waste water treatment facility
could not accommodate the refuse of 1,500 persons and the excess would flow
through an open ditch into the Caribbean.'95 Furthermore, authorities anticipated
the disposal of 15,000 pounds of solid waste per day at the Juana Diaz Municipal
Landfill, an already overloaded dump with flooding problems.'96
Beyond the grotesque factual scenario it envisioned, the court found
sufficient legal reasons for halting the refugee transfer. NEPA was the primary
sword for the plaintiffs. The court reaffirmed the government's inability to rely
on the NEPA exemption in the DRA because no "emergency" existed.'9 7
The court carefully scrutinized the pollution exemptions pursuant to
Executive Order 12,244. It echoed the appellate court's ruling that a discretionary
decision by the President is unreviewable under the APA."9 ' In a footnote, the
court lamented that it could not review the order.'99 The court suggested that,
rather than being in the "paramount interest of the United States," the order
granting exemptions was in the political interest of the President.2"' It noted the
overall injustice in allowing this exemption, reasoning that while Puerto Rico did
not have the right to vote for the presidency, the result affected the citizens and
government of Puerto Rico without affording them the right to seek redress.20'
The court considered the language of the Executive Order and the
relevant pollution statutes, noting that the limited scope of the RCRA exemption
did not cover all consequences of the refugee activities.20 2 Thus, by law the
President could not exempt certain activities; any portion of the order granting an
unlawful exemption would be deemed invalid. Fort Allen had no solid waste
management facility, and RCRA allowed only for an exemption from such a
facility. RCRA contrasted solid waste management facilities or disposal sites
which could be exempted with activities resulting, or which might have resulted,
in the disposal of solid or hazardous waste which could not be exempted.2 3 The
type of activity at Fort Allen could not be exempted; therefore, the government,
left unprotected by the Executive Order, violated RCRA.2°4
This analysis demonstrates that the way to argue against an executive
order exemption is not to contend that the President had no authority to grant the
193. Id. at 1043 n.8.
194. Id. at 1044.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1047.
199. Id. at 1048 n.14.
200. Id at 1047.
201. Id.
202. Id at 1048.
203. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b)(1), (2).
204. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. at 1049.
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exemption at all, but rather that he exceeded the statutory scope of his authority
to exempt. While discretionary acts of the President may be unreviewable, the
President has no discretion to act beyond the scope of his authority.
The court noted that, whether the President's action is reviewable under
the APA, it may be subject to NEPA. °5 Under section 102 of NEPA, an agency
must consider the environmental impacts of an action before making a decision. °6
It must comply with this mandate to the fullest extent possible, unless there is a
clear conflict of statutory authority.27 An agency must adhere to a careful and
informed decisionmaking process. A court cannot reverse a substantive decision
of an agency unless: (1) the balance of costs and benefits is arbitrary and
capricious, or (2) the agency clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental
values.08 Here, the court found no conflict of statutory authority between
sections 102 of NEPA and 501 of REAA. 209 REAA section 501(c)(3) only
exempts compliance with NEPA's EIS requirements and section (D); other NEPA
requirements must be satisfied regardless of whether an action is considered a
"major federal action."2 "° The court found a clear violation of NEPA in selecting
Fort Allen because the President did not carefully consider environmental
factors.21'
The government argued that the President is not subject to NEPA because
he is not an "agency" pursuant to CEQ regulations.1 2 The court determined that
the regulations were without statutory authority and contrary to case law. NEPA
does not define "agency," so the meaning under the APA controls.213 The court
stated that since most commentators favor including the President in the term
"agency," he would be considered an agency in this case.2 14 The court ordered
a permanent injunction against the transfer of refugees until the government
complied with its duties under NEPA." 5
The government appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeals vacated the
injunction with the understanding that the government would comply with the
conditions of a consent agreement reached with the Puerto Rican government.2 6
The partial contents of the consent decree were:
205. Id. at 1051.
206. Id. at 1049. See also NEPA § 102(2)(c).
207. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. at 1055.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1056.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1057.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1981).
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" The total number of aliens and pennanent employees at Fort Allen
shall not exceed 1,500 persons, and the total number of aliens cannot
exceed 800 persons." 7
" No solid waste will be disposed in Juana Diaz. Disposal elsewhere
will be in accordance with Puerto Rico statutes and regulations.218
" The United States will perform medical screening and take additional
measures to prevent the outbreak of contagious disease.219
" Fort Allen will not be used for longer than one year, beginning
August 12, 1981.220
The court held that this agreement mooted issues regarding compliance
with RCRA. It held that the REAA appears to exempt the government from all
NEPA duties but that the consent decree moots the issue.22' Furthermore, an
injunction would not be appropriate even if there were a NEPA violation because
the balance of equities favored the government.222 The factor weighing heavily
in favor of the government was the President's declaration that the Fort Allen
pollution exemptions2 3 were of paramount interest to the United States. 224
Interestingly, the court did not address the validity and scope of Executive Order
12,244.
V. DE FACTO NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION
By expressly including pollution law exemptions for certain federal
facilities based on "national security" or "paramount" interests, Congress expected
the United States government to request an exemption when it believed
complying with the law would be contrary to national interests. The government
took the exemption one step further by arguing before a court that an alleged
violation of pollution law must continue, even without an exemption, because
national security and the paramount interest of the United States warranted such
action. Thus, the government sought to create a defense claiming national security
where it had not requested nor received a presidential exemption.
In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,225 plaintiff sued the Navy for violating
the CWA. Navy training exercises caused ordnance to fall into the water
217. Id. at 614.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 615.
222. Id. at 616.
223. These pollution exemptions are not addressed in this opinion.
224. Colon, 668 F.2d at 617.
225. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
308 [Vol. 19:287
NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS
surrounding Puerto Rico.226 The Navy neither requested nor received a
presidential exemption. The district court denied plaintiff's request for an
injunction, stating that the court had the discretion to grant an injunction or to
order other appropriate relief to ensure compliance with the CWA.227 The Court
of Appeals vacated the district court order and remanded the case with
instructions that the court order the Navy to cease the CWA violation until it
obtained a permit.228 It reasoned that the Navy could request an exemption if it
were necessary for national security.229
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that a district
court had complete discretion to fashion any appropriate remedy to cure a
violation of the CWA. ° The Court stated that the availability of an exemption
did not limit the district court's discretion.' In other words, the grant of an
exemption was not the only way for the federal government to continue activities
which violate the law. The Court construed the purpose of the exemption
provision to allow noncompliance in extraordinary circumstances. 232  It
determined that the exemption provision and the court's discretion in fashioning
a remedy for a violation were complementary concepts.233
Allowing judicial discretion to deny an injunction eviscerated the need
for an exemption. If the military believed that the President would not grant an
exemption, it may carry on its activities regardless. When the military is sued,
it may admit a violation of law and argue that the court should issue a fine
instead of granting an injunction because national interests require the activity to
continue.
Dissenting Justice Stevens recognized exactly what the majority had
created-ajudicially-issued national security exemption.234 Justice Stevens argued
that exemptions were nonreviewable and best left to the President.235 Wh6re the
President did not grant an exemption, the courts should not artificially create
one.
236
In Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation v. Hodel, the DOE
excused its violation of RCRA on national security grounds and contended that
it could not comply with both RCRA and the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA"). 237
226. Id. at 307.
227. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 837 (lst Cir. 1981).
228. Id at 862-63.
229. Id. at 862.
230. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 311.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 318.
233. Id
234. Id. at 324.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) [hereinafter LEAF]; Atomic Energy Act 42
U.S.C. § 2014(y).
1995]
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Plaintiff filed suit because the Y-12 nuclear plant at DOE's Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, facility produced large amounts of hazardous wastes containing
chromium, mercury, PCBs, and cadmium. 28 The DOE admitted that, over a
twenty year period, about 2.4 million pounds of mercury were released into the
environment. The DOE argued that RCRA and the AEA imposed conflicting
requirements and that therefore the RCRA violation was excused.239
The court, however, found no inconsistency in the two statutes.240 The
burden was on the DOE to show that RCRA would require disclosure of restricted
nuclear materials data protected by the AEA, and the government failed its
burden.24 Furthermore, the court reasoned that, if there is inconsistency, the
government should apply for a presidential exemption for the nuclear project. 242
The DOE had not applied for an exemption, and the court was not willing to
consider national security as a defense to the RCRA violation.243
In National Resources Defense Council v. Watkins, plaintiffs sued the
DOE to block the reopening of a nuclear reactor at the Savannah River Site until
the completion of a cooling tower. 44 The DOE, allegedly in violation of the
CWA, had not requested an exemption.245 The reactor was cooled by drawing
water from the Savannah River, circulating it once through the reactor cooling
system, then discharging the water into Indian Grave Branch, a tributary of the
Savannah River.2
46
The district court entered summary judgment against plaintiffs on the
issue of standing.247 The appellate court held that although plaintiffs had
standing, remaining questions of fact precluded summary judgment.24' The DOE
argued that, although it was not eligible for an exemption because compliance
with the CWA was feasible, national security concerns excused any violation of
the CWA.249 The court did not agree with the DOE's argument. It held that
impossibility of compliance with a pollution statute was not a prerequisite for a
Presidential exemption and, thus, that the DOE was eligible to apply for an
exemption."
The holding in NRDC v. Watkins makes perfect sense. If Congress had
intended for the President to grant an exemption only when compliance was
238. LEAF, 586 F. Supp. at 1166.
239. Id. at 1167.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992).
245. Id. at 977.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 976.
248. Id. at 981.
249. Id. at 982.
250. Id.
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impossible, Congress would have spoken thus. Limiting an exemption to those
circumstances would severely limit the availability and thwart the purpose of the
exemptions. Arguably, if compliance were impossible because of national
security, a court might find a de facto exemption. The cases analyzed above
found no such inconsistency; therefore, the question remains open.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE EXEMPTIONS
President Clinton has not made an explicit statement regarding his policy
on granting pollution law exemptions for reasons of national security. In piecing
together fragments of Clinton's actions related to the issue, it appears Clinton is
hesitant to give the federal government broad exemptions from its own laws.
Where Clinton has granted national security exemptions from minor pollution
laws, such as alternative fuel vehicles, the controls over federal facilities are
drafted so loosely that the military could probably excuse noncompliance even
without an express exemption.
In late 1991, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") proposed a rule
exempting escorted national security shipments of hazardous materials from
federal hazardous materials transportation regulations." At the time, only
radioactive materials shipped by the DOE or DOD escorted by certain personnel
were exempt.252 The DOT proposal would have exempted shipments escorted by
personnel in transportation vehicles, other than those carrying hazardous materials,
with a document certifying the shipment was for national security.253 The
proposal was not adopted, and to date the only exemption is for the transportation
of radioactive materials.
Statutory exemptions do not allow a lack of funding to serve as the basis
for granting an exemption unless the President asked for funding and Congress
denied it. Lack of funding may cause a serious problem as the government
attempts to clean up contaminated facilities. As more money is needed, Congress
may hesitate to allocate larger sums of money if there is little evidence of
progress in the cleanups. If Congress denies the needed funding, the President
has a basis for granting exemptions.
During the Bush Administration, funding for cleaning up wastes at federal
facilities tripled.254 For example, DOE environmental programs grew from $1.7
billion in 1989 to nearly $5.5 billion for 1993.255 Funding for DOD
251. 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 595 (Aug. 9, 1991); 49 C.F.R. 173.7 (1991).
252. 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 595 (Aug. 9, 1991); 49 C.F.R. § 173.7 (1991).
253. 56 Fed. Reg. 37,505 (1991).
254. Cleaning Up Federal Facilities: Controversy over an Environmental Peace Dividend, Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at d27 (Jan. 13, 1993).
255. Id.
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environmental programs, including restoration efforts at operating and closing
bases, jumped from $500 million in 1989 to $2.2 billion in 1993.256
Critics argue that the government has under-funded cleanup programs.
The NRDC has stated that the DOE's $5.5 billion budget was insufficient because
much of the money was for "non-environmental or non-essential environmental
activities. 257  The group accused the DOE of siphoning money from
environmental accounts to pay for ongoing nuclear production activities, such as
the operation of a PUREX facility at Hanford, Washington. The NRDC estimated
that only $1.38 billion of the $5.5 billion budget went to the restoration of
previously contaminated sites.258
The DOD has 17,000 contaminated sites in its cleanup inventory.259 It
has "closed out" 6,736, but only 372 are completed. The rest were assessed and
determined not to pose a significant threat to public health and the environment.'
The most expensive cleanup is at the former Army Rocky Mountain Arsenal near
Denver. The cleanup will take years and will cost over $2 billion. Interestingly,
this arsenal is the first Superfund site slated to become a wildlife refuge. Other
costly cleanups include McClellan Air Force Base in California ($1.6 billion) and
El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, also in California ($300 million).26 ' One
commentator suggests that, because of the way environmental activities at DOD
facilities are funded, it is unlikely that the President could grant an exemption on
the basis of a lack of funds.262  Funding for environmental compliance and
cleanup at Army bases comes from three sources: (1) the Defense Environmental
Restoration Account ("DERA"), (2) the military construction account, and (3) the
operation and maintenance account.263 The DOD has not identified funds required
to meet environmental compliance requirements, with the exception of DERA
funds which are limited to CERCLA response and remedial activities under the
Defense Environmental Restoration Program ("DERP").2" Lack of appropriation
is a basis for an exemption only if the President specifically requested such. The
commentator suggests that this requirement may never be satisfied because there
is little specific allocation for environmental matters at the DOD.265
Another commentator ignores the specific appropriation issue and sees the
potential for many future exemptions at DOD facilities in the mobilization of
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Mark J. Connor, Government Owned-Contractor Operated Munitions Facilities: Are They
Appropriate in the Age of Strict Environmental Compliance and Cleanup?, 131 MIL. L. REV. 1, 48
(1991).
263. Id. at 48-49.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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presently inactive munitions facilities.266 If world events thrust the United States
into large-scale war, the military would need more supplies quickly.267 Old DOD
facilities which have not been active or at full capacity in many years may need
to be reactivated.268 Most such facilities probably lack pollution control
equipment that would satisfy modem standards.269 This would inevitably result
in discharges in violation of many pollution laws. 270 Because of time and budget
constraints, these old facilities might not be retrofitted to comply with
environmental standards.27' The President could exempt a mobilized facility on
the grounds of "national security" or "paramount interest. 27
2
While the DOD's problems are broad in scope, the DOE's problems are
deep. The DOE owns fourteen facilities in thirteen states which make weapons
considered vital to national security. All sites are heavily contaminated due to
manufacturing and research activities at the sites involving highly dangerous
chemicals and radioactive materials. The estimated cost of cleaning up all DOE
sites is $100 billion to $200 billion over the next thirty years.273 This figure
could soar much higher because costs are difficult to predict. Secretary Hazel
O'Leary recently stated that the DOE has established a value of respect for the
environment.274 O'Leary asserted that the DOE has taken a hard look at how
much the Department has spent cleaning up facilities and has found that it was
spending 30% more than other organizations doing the same work.275 The DOE
set a goal for the next three years to reduce its cleanup cost by 10% each year.276
One assumes that O'Leary meant that the DOE would become more efficient in
spending money, not just that they would spend less. If the DOE does not
become more adept at conducting cleanups but continues to reduce its budget,
cleanups at some facilities may grind to a halt. Of course, this would open the
door for the grant of a presidential exemption.
Clearly, cleaning up federal facilities is enormously expensive. Taxpayers
may not be willing to pay the tab and instead may settle for merely fencing off
and exempting some facilities. Presidential exemptions may become less
266. Charles W. Tucker, Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and Local Environmental
Regulations, 35 NAVAL L. REV. 87 (1986).
267. Id. at 106.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 101. See also Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. § 243 (1978) (reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1982)).
273. Id. at 106.
274. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, Remarks at Press Briefing (Apr. 21, 1994) (transcript
available at 1994 WL 140628).
275. Id.
276. Id.
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controversial as costs rise and the public becomes skeptical about the actual health
risks presented by old military bases and nuclear weapons plants.
In April 1993, Clinton issued an Executive Order on Alternative Fuel
Vehicles.2 77 This order requires every federal agency to adopt aggressive plans
to exceed the alternative fueled vehicle purchase requirements established by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992.278 Clinton showed his hand on exemptions in section
8 where he gave a broad national security exemption.279 The President authorized
the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General to
determine the extent to which the requirements of this order apply to the national
security, protection and law enforcement activities of their respective agencies.280
This is carte blanche authority for Cabinet members to exempt completely
activities under their control. Arguably, the military would not be forced to
comply with this order even without the exemption because the mandates of the
order are loosely drafted with several escape hatches. Clearly, this order is less
stringent than pollution statutes. There are no meaningful standards or forceful
requirements, so the exemption may not give the military any additional
protection.
An executive order signed in August 1993 made federal facilities subject
to right-to-know laws.281 In the interest of national security, the head of a federal
agency can request an exemption from complying with the provisions of any
aspect of this order, provided the procedures set forth in CERCLA section
1200)(1) are followed. This exemption provision provides little insight into
Clinton's policy because it is a boilerplate clause which even cites an exemption
provision in another statute. Clinton's selection of "national security" rather than
"paramount interest" as the prerequisite may indicate that Clinton will only grant
exemptions in crisis situations, because paramount interest may be interprdted
much more expansively than national security. Significantly, this order does not
create any right enforceable by a party against the United States.282 Thus, the
military may have little incentive to comply with the order since there are no
legal repercussions for noncompliance. As discussed earlier, executive orders are
nonreviewable as long as the President does not exceed his authority.
The CWA is up for reauthorization. A review of proposed amendments
to the Act shows that the exemption provision will probably remain unchanged.28
Thp House CWA reauthorization bill introduced by Representative Norman
Mineta preserves the present language. A substitute House CWA reauthorization
bill also keeps the entire language of the CWA exemption in substance. The only
277. Exec. Order on Alternative Fuel Vehicles (unnumbered), 1993 WL 35732.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Exec. Order No. 12,856, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,981 (1993).
282. Id. § 7-701.
283. Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at d34 (Mar. 7, 1994).
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change is that section 313(a) is divided into more readable subsections.284 Since
the CWA's exemption provision is untouched so far, it is likely that the
exemptions in most federal pollution laws will remain the same, at least for the
near future.
VII. CONCLUSION
National security exemptions in federal pollution laws have mostly lain
dormant for the past two decades. The only official exemption via executive
order to date prompted a rash of litigation. The subject of the exemption was
highly controversial in Puerto Rico but politically favorable to the President
among his Florida voters. Current political issues such as the turbulent crisis in
Haiti, the potential need to reactivate dormant munitions facilities and the
exorbitant cost of cleaning up numerous contaminated federal facilities may lead
to a number of exemptions in the near future.
Executive orders are by nature discretionary and unreviewable.
Aggrieved citizens can attack the President's exemption collaterally by arguing
that the President exceeded his statutory authority by granting too broad an
exemption. In addition, alleging a violation of NEPA is an excellent means to
delay or halt an unwise action. NEPA does not have an explicit national security
exemption, and courts disfavor creating one.
Even without an exemption, the military may always argue that it cannot
comply with certain pollution statutes because doing so would be inconsistent
with another statutory mandate and would threaten national security. Courts have
not definitively determined whether there is a de facto national security exemption
in the case of inconsistent obligations, With the trend toward expanding the
waivers of sovereign immunity in pollution law, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court would allow the government to escape its own laws, without an exemption,
under the cloak of national security.
284. Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at d33 (Apr. 26, 1994).
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